When showing your hand pays off: Announcing strategic intentions in
  Colonel Blotto games by Chandan, Rahul et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
11
64
8v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
4 M
ar 
20
20
When showing your hand pays off:
Announcing strategic intentions in Colonel Blotto games
Rahul Chandan Keith Paarporn Jason R. Marden
Abstract—In competitive adversarial environments, it is often
advantageous to obfuscate one’s strategies or capabilities. How-
ever, revealing one’s strategic intentions may shift the dynamics
of the competition in complex ways. Can it ever be advantageous
to reveal strategic intentions to an opponent? In this paper,
we consider three-stage Colonel Blotto games in which one
player can choose whether or not to pre-commit resources to
a single battlefield before play begins. This pre-commitment is
public knowledge. In response, the opponent can either secure
the battlefield by matching the pre-commitment with its own
forces, or withdraw. In a two-player setting, we show that a
weaker player never has an incentive to pre-commit any amount
of resources to a battlefield regardless of how valuable it is.
We then consider a three-player setting in which two players
fight against a common adversary on separate fronts. Only
one of the two players facing the adversary has the option of
pre-committing. We find there are instances where this player
benefits from pre-committing. The analysis indicates that under
non-cooperative team settings and no possibility of forming
alliances, there can be incentives to publicly announce one’s
strategic intentions to an adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Colonel Blotto game models competitive resource
allocation problems in which two opposing players strate-
gically distribute their respective budgets across a set of
battlefields. The aim of each player is to accrue as much
value as possible by securing battlefields. The game has been
studied in the context of political campaigns [1], [2], security
of cyber-physical systems [3], [4], and competitive markets
[5].
First introduced by Borel in 1921 [6], mixed strategy
Nash equilibria have been developed and characterized for
Blotto games over the last one hundred years. These equi-
libria describe players’ optimal security strategies as well
as their performance guarantees. The work of Roberson [7]
established a general solution for an arbitrary number of
homogeneous battlefields and asymmetric resource budgets.
Solutions to the General Lotto game, a variant of the Colonel
Blotto game, have been established in more general settings
as it allows for a higher degree of analytical tractability [8],
[9]. Irrespective of the setup, the non-existence of pure Nash
equilibria in many cases of interest suggests competitors that
employ predictable strategies are exploitable [5], [10].
However, revealing one’s intentions may shift the dynam-
ics of the competition. For example, consider two firms A
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and B competing for control over multiple markets. Firm B
expresses interest in a new, niche market, and announces its
investment in this market. This presents a choice to firm A;
A can choose either to 1) give up on this market and focus its
resources on others, possibly in competition with firms other
than B, or 2) divert some of its resources to stay competitive
against B in the new market. In effect, firm B sets the price
to compete in the new market.
In the context of Colonel Blotto games, the focus of
this paper centers on whether a player can improve upon
its standard equilibrium performance by announcing a pre-
commitment of resources to a single battlefield. We first
consider a three-stage, two-player scenario. In the first stage,
one player decides whether or not to pre-commit resources to
a battlefield of its choice. If it does not commit, the players
play the classic one-shot game over the entire set of battle-
fields in stage two. If it decides to commit, the player decides
how many resources to allocate to that battlefield. Then, in
stage two, the adversary decides to either match the pre-
commitment on that battlefield, or to send no resources. In
stage three, they play the one-shot game over the remaining
battlefields with the re-distribution of forces.
We then consider a three-stage, three-player game in which
two players compete against a common adversary, each on
separate fronts. Only one of the players on the team (say,
player 1) has the option of pre-committing to a battlefield
in the first stage. In this scenario, the adversary must now
decide how to split its forces among two fronts, as well
as whether or not to call the pre-commitment of player 1.
In stage three, two one-shot games are played between the
adversary and each of the two team members.
Previous work has considered similar three-stage, three-
player setups, in which the team players have the option
of transferring resources among each other, or of adding
battlefields to their respective one-shot games [11], [12],
[4], [13]. The problem we pose here differs in regard to
the non-possibility of forming alliances even when there
is a common enemy. This reflects non-cooperative settings
characterized by a lack of communication or consent to
collaboration [14], [15], [16], [17]. For example, consider
two different companies that must protect their data servers
against a hacker intent on accessing as much data as possible
(from one or both of the companies’ servers). The security
of one of the company’s servers is not the responsibility
or even concern of the other. If one of the companies had
an opportunity to announce a pre-commitment of security
resources on a portion of its servers, how would this change
the hacker’s own allocation of resources to access data? We
seek to address whether such a pre-commitment relieves
attack pressure the company would have faced otherwise.
Our Contributions:
Our main findings are as follows. In a one-vs-one setting,
the weaker resource player will never have an incentive to
pre-commit resources. That is, it will always prefer to play
the standard one-shot game contested over the entire set
of battlefields. In the three-player setup, we find there are
instances in which the weaker player can benefit from pre-
committing.
These findings provide insight into the circumstances
under which a single competitor can profit from a public
announcement of strategies. A two-player setting is not
complex enough for a pre-commitment to sufficiently draw
an adversary’s attention away from valuable prizes. However
in a three-player setting, the presence of a team member can
serve as a distraction to the adversary.
II. PRELIMINARIES: STATIC COLONEL BLOTTO AND
GENERAL LOTTO GAMES
Consider a game wherein two players, A (the adversary)
and B, simultaneously allocate their respective budgets, XA
and XB , over a set of n ≥ 2 battlefields, B = {1, . . . , n}.
Each battlefield b ∈ B has an associated value vb > 0, which
is won by the player assigning a higher level of force to b, at
the cost of the opposing player, i.e., given budget allocations
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,n) ∈ Rn for both i ∈ {A,B}, the payoff
to player i is
n∑
b=1
vb sign(xi,b − x−i,b),
where −i is the player opposing i. For ease of notation, we
will assume that player A wins if there is a tie.
The Colonel Blotto game is a game as defined above
where, for each player i ∈ {A,B}, a valid budget allocation
xi satisfies xi,b ≥ 0 for all b ∈ B, and
∑n
b=1 xi,b ≤ Xi.
A valid mixed strategy in a Colonel Blotto game is an n-
variate probability distribution function, Si : R
n → [0, 1],
with support only in the set of valid budget allocations.
The General Lotto game represents a variation of the
Colonel Blotto game where a valid mixed strategy Si need
only satisfy the budget constraint in expectation, i.e., for both
i ∈ {A,B},
n∑
b=1
ESi,b [xi,b] ≤ Xi,
where Si,b : R→ [0, 1] is the univariate marginal distribution
of Si corresponding to battlefield b ∈ B. Note that the budget
constraint is relaxed in the General Lotto game. Indeed, a
budget allocation xi such that
∑n
b=1 xb > Xi can still be
attributed positive probability in the mixed strategy Si of a
player i ∈ {A,B}. Given player budgets XA, XB > 0, and
a set of n battlefields B with v = (v1, . . . , vn), we denote
the corresponding General Lotto game as GL(XA, XB,B).
As both Colonel Blotto and General Lotto are zero-sum
games, the players’ equilibrium payoffs are unique. We
. . . . . .v1 vb vn
XA
XB
xB,1 xB,n
xA,1 xA,n
(a)
. . .
6= b
v1 vn vb
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XB − t
txB,1 xB,n
xA,1 {0, t}
(b)
Fig. 1. The two possible outcomes of the General Lotto game with pre-
commitments. In a), player B does not pre-commit to a transfer of its
forces to a battlefield b ∈ B. The two players play a one-shot General
Lotto game over all the battlefields in B. In b), player B pre-commits a
force t ∈ [0, XB] to a battlefield b ∈ B. Player A subsequently has the
choice of sending an equivalent force to battlefield b (calling), or abstaining
from allocating any of its budget to b (folding). The two players play a
one-shot General Lotto game over the rest of the battlefields, B \ {b}.
reproduce the equilibrium payoffs of the General Lotto game
here.
Proposition 1 (General Lotto payoffs [12]). For player
budgets XA, XB > 0, and φ =
∑n
b=1 vb, the equilibrium
payoff to a player i ∈ {A,B} in the game GL(XA, XB,B)
is, 

φ
(
Xi
X−i
− 1
)
if 0 < Xi ≤ X−i
φ
(
1− X−iXi
)
if Xi > X−i.
(1)
The players’ equilibrium payoffs in the General Lotto
game arbitrarily approximates those of the Colonel Blotto
game when the number of battlefields becomes large (see
[12] for a discussion), and are relatively simple to compute.
For this reason, we consider the static General Lotto game
as the primitive model of competitive resource allocation in
the forthcoming multi-stage models.
III. PRE-COMMITMENTS IN A TWO-PLAYER SETTING
In this section, we formulate a three-stage, two-player
General Lotto game. In the first stage, player B has the
option to pre-commit resources to a single battlefield of its
choice. Here, we are assuming player B has fewer resources
than player A, i.e., XB < XA. If B decides not to commit
any resources, the players play their equilibrium strategies in
the static General Lotto game GL(XA, XB,B) in the second
stage. In the final stage, players are assigned the final payoffs
according to (1). This outcome is illustrated in Figure 1(a).
However, if B does decide to pre-commit, it chooses one
of the battlefields b ∈ B as well as an amount t ∈ [0, XB]
of resources to commit to b in the first stage. In the second
stage, player A observes player B’s choices b and t, and
decides whether to dedicate t of its own budget XA in order
to win the battlefield b (A calls), or to save its budget for
the remaining battlefields and lose the battlefield b (A folds).
If A calls, it wins battlefield b, and the static Lotto game
GL(XA−t,XB−t,B\b) is played among the n−1 remaining
battlefields in stage three. Player A’s final payoff is then
ucallA (XA, XB, t) = (φ− vb)
(
1− XB − t
XA − t
)
+ vb. (2)
If A folds, battlefield b is won by player B, and the static
Lotto game GL(XA−t,XB,B\b) is played among the other
n− 1 battlefields. Player A’s final payoff in this case is
ufoldA (XA, XB, t) = (φ − vb)
(
1− XB − t
XA
)
− vb. (3)
In effect, the competition for b becomes a separate, single
battlefield Colonel Blotto game on which B has committed
to sending exactly t resources. The setup here is illustrated in
Figure 1(b). We assume player A is rational and chooses the
action in stage 2 that maximizes its final payoff. Formally,
we may then write the final (optimal) payoff to player A as
pitA(XA, XB) := max
{
ucallA (XA, XB, t), u
fold
A (XA, XB, t)
}
.
(4)
As the game remains zero-sum, the player B receives a final
payoff of pitB(XA, XB) := −pitA(XA, XB). We say that there
exists a profitable pre-commitment for B if there exist b ∈ B
and t ∈ [0, XB] such that
∆pitB := pi
t
B(XA, XB)− piB(XA, XB) > 0, (5)
where piB(XA, XB) is given by the first entry of (1).
Intuitively, if (5) holds for some b ∈ B and t ∈ [0, XB],
player B can improve upon its payoff from the standard
General Lotto game setup by making an appropriate pre-
commitment. The following theorem states there is never an
incentive for B to make a pre-commitment. In other words,
condition (5) never holds for any XB < XA, t ∈ [0, XB],
and b ∈ B.
Theorem 1. Consider the two-player sequential General
Lotto game where XB < XA. Then there is no pre-
commitment t ∈ [0, XB] for playerB to any battlefield b ∈ B
such that ∆pitB ≥ 0.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark. It is worth noting here that the above result cannot
be shown by applying a min-max argument. By making a
pre-commitment of t forces to battlefield b, player B does
not only impose a static allocation in its own feasible set of
actions, it also reduces the set of admissible actions available
to player A. Observe that A continues to play the standard
General Lotto game against B on battlefields B \ b, but that
its actions on b are restricted to either call or fold. If A were
still capable of playing its original mixed strategy across all
battlefields in B after B’s pre-commitment, then a min-max
argument would be applicable.
IV. THE THREE-PLAYER SETTING
In the previous section, we showed that no pre-
commitment can increase the payoff of a weaker player in the
two-player setting. Since the players are solely focused on
competing with each other, the weaker player has no recourse
that will increase its payoff, as it is already at a disadvantage.
In this section, we consider whether a weaker player can
increase its payoff via pre-commitment in a setting where
the adversary is competing with an additional player.
A. Coalitional General Lotto games with pre-commitment
We consider a modified version of the three-player coali-
tional General Lotto game studied in, e.g., [11], [12], [4],
[13]. In the game, a player A competes against two players,
1 and 2, on two disjoint sets of battlefields, B1 and B2,
with battlefield values vj = (vj,1, . . . , vj,|Bj |) such that
φj =
∑
b∈Bj
vj,b, for j = 1, 2. Players 1, 2 and A have
positive budgets X1, X2, and XA, respectively. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the players’ budgets such that
XA = 1. The game has the following sequential structure:
1) Player 1 decides whether to pre-commit a force t ∈
[0, X1] that it will not use, to pre-commit a force t ∈
[0, X1] to a battlefield b ∈ B1, or to not make any pre-
commitment. We denote by Xt1, player 1’s budget after
making its decision, i.e., Xt1 = X1 − t if player 1 makes
a pre-commitment t ∈ [0, X1], and Xt1 = X1 if it does
not.
2) If player 1 chose not to pre-commit a force t to any
battlefield b ∈ B1, player A splits its budget between
the two sets of battlefields; a force XA1 ≥ 0 is assigned
to B1, and a force XA2 ≥ 0 is assigned to B2 such that
XA1 +XA2 = 1, as in [12].
Else, if player 1 pre-committed a force t to a battlefield
b ∈ B1, then player A splits its budget such that XtA1 +
XtA2 = 1. If X
t
A1 > t and A calls, the forces X
t
A1 −
t,XA2 are assigned to sets B1 \ {b} and B2, respectively.
Otherwise, A folds, and XtA1, XA2 ≥ 0 are assigned to
sets B1 \ {b} and B2, respectively.
3) If player 1 pre-committed a force t to a battlefield b ∈
B1, the players play two one-shot General Lotto games;
the game GL(Xt1, X
t
A1,B1\{b}), and GL(X2, XtA2,B2).
Simultaneously, player A wins battlefield b if it called in
the previous step, or loses b if it folded.
Else, if player 1 did not pre-commit a force to a battlefield
in B1, the players play two one-shot General Lotto games;
GL(X1, XA1,B1), and GL(X2, XA2,B2).
The decision made in each step becomes common knowl-
edge among the three players in the subsequent steps. The
payoff to player A is the sum of the payoffs it receives in
the one-shot General Lotto games it plays with each of the
players i ∈ {1, 2}, plus its losses or gains on the battlefield
b if player 1 pre-commits. Player A’s decision to call or
fold on a pre-commitment always maximizes its payoff, as
in the previous section. Observe that if player 1 decides to
use less than its full budget of X1, or to pre-commit a force
t ∈ [0, X1] to a given battlefield b ∈ B1, it does not require
any dialogue with player 2. The game structures ensuing
from player 1’s choices of not pre-committing any force,
and of pre-committing a force t to the battlefield b ∈ B1 are
illustrated in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), respectively.
From [12], the optimal split of player A’s budget into
XA1, XA2 in stage 2 is determined by distinct regions of the
B1 B2
. . . . . .
XA1 XA2
X1 X2
XA
(a)
B2
. . .
B1 \ {b}
b . . .
t
{0, t}
{X foldA1 , XcallA1} XA2
X1 − t X2
XA
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) The game structure resulting from player 1’s choice to not pre-commit a force to any battlefield in B1 (Stage 1). In Stage 2, player A splits its
budget XA into the two forces XA1,XA2 > 0 such that XA1+XA2 = XA. In the final stage, two General Lotto games are played, GL(X1,XA1,B1),
and GL(X2,XA2,B2), between A and 1, and A and 2, respectively. (b) The game structure resulting from player 1’s choice to pre-commit a force
t ∈ [0, X1] to battlefield b ∈ B1 (Stage 1). In Stage 2, player A decides whether to match player 1’s pre-commitment or fold (i.e. xA,b ∈ {0, t}, and
splits the remainder of its budget into two forces XA1,XA2 > 0. If A calls, then XA1 +XA2 = 1− t, otherwise, XA1 +XA2 = 1. In the final stage,
two General Lotto games are played, GL(Xt
1
,XA1,B1 \ {b}), and GL(X2,XA2,B2), between A and 1, and A and 2, respectively. Player A wins the
battlefield b ∈ B1 if it calls, and loses b if it folds.
parameter space with Xi, X−i > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, φ1 and
φ2, where −i is the other player in {1, 2}:
• Case 1: φiφ−i >
max{(Xi)
2,1}
XiX−i
. This corresponds to the
region where player A maximizes its payoff by committing
all of its forces to the General Lotto game on the set of
battlefields Bi, i.e., XAi = XA and XA(−i) = 0.
• Case 2: φiφ−i >
Xi
X−i
and 0 < 1 −
√
φiXiX−i
φ−i
≤ X−i.
This is the range of values for which the following split
maximizes A’s payoff:
XAi =
√
φiXiX−i
φ−i
> Xi
XA(−i) = 1−XAi < X−i.
• Case 3: φiφ−i ≥
Xi
X−i
and 1−
√
φiXiX−i
φ−i
> X−i. In order
to maximize its payoff, player A splits its budget as
XAi =
√
Xiφi√
Xiφi +
√
X−iφ(−i)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
• Case 4: φiφ−i =
Xi
X−i
andXi+X−i ≥ 1. Any split of player
A’s budget results in the same payoff, thus XAi ∈ [0, 1],
XA(−i) = 1−XAi.
Note that player A splits its budget differently in the cases
1 and 2 depending on whether i = 1 or i = 2. Meanwhile,
the split is independent of i in cases 3 and 4. The regions
are illustrated in Fig. 3 for φ1 = φ2. If player 1 pre-commits
in stage 1 of the game, and player A calls, we will be re-
normalizing the players’ budgets such that XA − t = 1 to
retain the cases for player A’s optimal budget divisions, i.e.,
for a pre-commitment t ∈ [0, X1], if player A calls, X1−t→
(X1 − t)/(1− t), X2 → X2/(1− t), and XA − t→ 1.
In line with our discussion in the previous sections, we
wish to find the ranges of values X1, X2, XA, φ1 and φ2
in which player 1 can improve its payoff by making a pre-
commitment. We first consider player 1’s choice of using
X2
X10 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Case 1 (i=2)
Case 2 (i=2)
Case 1 (i=1)
Case 2 (i=1)
Case 3
Case 4
Fig. 3. The cases dividing the possible player budgets X1,X2 > 0, which
we borrow from [12]. This illustration corresponds to a coalitional General
Lotto game in which φ1 = φ2.
less than its full budget, which we show cannot increase its
payoff in the theorem below.
Theorem 2. Consider the setting with player budgets
X1, X2, XA > 0 and battlefield values such that φi =∑
b∈Bi
vb > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, pi1(X1 − t,XtA1) ≤
pi1(X1, XA1), for all X1, X2, t > 0, where X
t
A1 is the
adversary’s allocation to B1 in its best response to player
1’s transfer t, and pi1(·, ·) is given by the first entry of (1).
Proof. We omit the details of the proof for brevity. However,
the approach is to show that the derivative with respect to
t > 0 of the function pi1(X1− t,XtA1) is non-positive for all
X1, X2 > 0. This can be verified independently for Cases 1
(i=1), 1 (i=2), 2 (i=1), 2 (i=2), 3, and 4.
We have shown that player 1 cannot increase its payoff
by pre-committing to using less than its full budget. Next,
we analyze whether player 1 can increase its payoff by pre-
committing a portion of its budget to a battlefield b ∈ B1,
i.e., for some t ∈ [0, X1],
pit1(X1, X
t
A1) ≥ pi1(X1, XA1),
where the functions pit1 and pi1 are defined over the set of
battlefields B1 as in (5). We denote by XtA1 the player A’s
optimal allocation to the set of battlefields B1 when player 1
pre-commits. Formally, when player 1 pre-commits a force
t to b ∈ B1,
XtA1 =
{
XcallA1 (t) + t if player A calls,
X foldA1 (t) if player A folds,
where XcallA1 (t) and X
fold
A1 (t) are player A’s optimal alloca-
tions to B1 \ {b} when calling and folding, respectively. The
valueXA1 is A’s optimal allocation to B1 when player 1 does
not pre-commit. In the following theorem, we characterize a
region in the parameter space 0 < X1, X2 < 1, φ1, φ2 > 0,
and 0 < vb < φ1 within which a particular choice of pre-
commitment increases player 1’s payoff.
Theorem 3. Consider a setting with player budgets 0 <
X1, X2 < 1 and XA = 1, and two sets of battlefields B1,B2
such that φj =
∑
b∈Bj
vb for j ∈ {1, 2}. For a battlefield
b ∈ B1 with value vb > 0, the pre-commitment
t∗ = X1 − φ1 − vb
φ2
X2,
increases player 1’s payoff if the budgets X1, X2 > 0 satisfy
t∗ > 0, and one of the following two sets of conditions:
1) player budgets X1, X2 are in Case 1 (i=1) for φ1, φ2,
X1 − t∗, X2 and (X1 − t∗)/(1 − t∗), X2/(1 − t∗) are in
Case 2 (i=2) for φ1 − vb, φ2, and
φ2(X1+X2−1) ≥ (φ1−vb)X2(X1−1) + vbX1X2 (6)
2vb ≥
[
X1−φ1−vb
φ2
X2
]
φ2
X2
. (7)
2) player budgets X1, X2 are in Case 2 (i=1) for φ1, φ2,
X1 − t∗, X2 and (X1 − t∗)/(1 − t∗), X2/(1 − t∗) are in
Case 2 (i=2) for φ1 − vb, φ2, and
φ2(X1+X2−1) ≥
√
φ1φ2X1X2 − (φ1−vb)X2, (8)
2vb ≥
[
X1−φ1−vb
φ2
X2
]
φ2
X2
. (9)
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
In Fig. 4, we plot the region in which the player budgets
0 < X1, X2 < 1 satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3 for
two parameterizations of the game, i.e., the region in which
player 1 can increase its payoff by pre-committing the force
t∗ > 0 to battlefield b ∈ B1. In contrast to the two-player
setting, we observe that there is a nonempty set of parameters
for which player 1 can make pre-commitments to increase
its payoff in this three-player game setup.
X2
X10 0.5 1.0
0
0.5
1.0
(a)
X2
X10 0.5 1.0
0
0.5
1.0
(b)
Fig. 4. The region in which player 1 can increase its payoff by pre-
committing t∗ > 0 of its force to the battlefield b ∈ B1, as in Theorem 3.
Plot a) corresponds to parameters φ1 − vb = φ2 = 1, and vb = 1/2. Plot
b) corresponds to parameters φ1 − vb = φ2 = 1, and vb = 1. The solid
lines divide the X1, X2-plane into the various cases for the game without
pre-commitments, i.e., the General Lotto games are over battlefields B1 and
B2. The dashed lines correspond to the game in which player 1 pre-commits
a force t∗ > 0 to battlefield b ∈ B, i.e, the General Lotto games are over
battlefields in B1 \ {b} and B2.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated whether announcing a strate-
gic intention could ever benefit a player. We modelled a
variant of the Colonel Blotto game in which one player can
pre-commit a portion of its budget.
In the one-vs-one setting, we proved that there is never
an incentive for a weaker player to pre-commit a portion
of its budget to any given battlefield. In the three-player
setting, wherein the adversary faces two players at once, we
demonstrated that situations do exist in which one of the
players facing the adversary can improve its payoff by pre-
committing some of its forces to a battlefield. In effect, such
announcements shift the adversary’s allocation of resources
towards the other player.
Future directions include an investigation of emergent
equilibrium outcomes when multiple players facing a
common adversary have the option to announce a pre-
commitment. Additionally, exploring how a pre-commitment
made by player 1 can affect the payoffs experienced by
the adversary and player 2 will provide insight into the
consequences of self-interested play.
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APPENDIX
A. The Two-Player Setting
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose player B pre-commits to
sending t ∈ (0, XB] of its budget to a battlefield b ∈ B.
Define γ := XBXA < 1 as the budget ratio. The approach is to
show that for any set of parameters (γ, vb) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, φ),
the payoff difference is negative (i.e., ∆pitB < 0). This
amounts to identifying the regions where it is optimal for
player A to call or fold, and evaluating the quantity ∆pitB .
Let φ˜ := φ− vb be the total valuation of prizes without b.
Using the payoffs for calling and folding ((2) and (3)), the
adversary calls on the pre-commitment if
C(t) :=
φ˜
X2A
t2 − t
XA
(2vb + φ˜γ) + 2vb > 0. (10)
It will fold if C(t) < 0, and is indifferent between calling and
folding if C(t) = 0. We have C(0) = 2vb > 0, C(XB) =
2vb(1−γ) > 0, and C′(tm) = 0 where tm := vbφ˜ XA+
1
2XB .
The roots of C(t) are
t± := tm ± XA
φ˜
√
Q(vb). (11)
where Q(vb) :=
φ˜2
X2
A
t2m − 2vbφ˜. Consequently, we will have
the following cases.
1) Suppose either tm < XB and Q(vb) < 0, or tm > XB .
Then C(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, XB], and the adversary
calls on all pre-commitments.
2) Suppose tm < XB and Q(vb) > 0. Then the adversary
calls if t ∈ [0, t−) ∪ (t+, XB] and folds if t ∈ [t−, t+]
The regions described by these cases is depicted in Figure
5. To prove the result, we need to show ∆pitB < 0 for
any set of parameters. Suppose the adversary calls on the
precommitment under any case. Player B’s payoff difference
is
∆pitB = φ˜
(
XB − t
XA − t − 1
)
− vb − φ
(
X1
XA
− 1
)
= φ˜
XB − t
XA − t − φ
XB
XA
< 0, ∀t ∈ [0, XB].
(12)
Consequently, player B never has an incentive to pre-
commit when the adversary calls. It remains to be shown
that B also never has an incentive to pre-commit in cases
where the adversary folds. We thus focus on case 2) when
t ∈ [t−, t+]. In this regime, the following condition is
satisfied:
Q(vb) = v
2
b (3− γ +
γ2
4
) + vbφ(−2 + γ − γ
2
2
) +
γ2
4
φ2
> 0.
(13)
We have Q(0) = 14γ
2φ > 0 and Q(φ) = φ2(1 − 14γ2) +
γ2
4 φ > 0. The roots of Q(vb) are calculated to be
v±(γ) :=
φ
2
(2− γ + 12γ2)± 2
√
1− γ
3− γ + 14γ2
(14)
The minimizer of Q(vb) lies in (0, φ). Additionally, the roots
v± are real and also lie in the interval (0, φ). We then have
Q(vb) > 0 for vb ∈ [0, v−) ∪ (v+, φ].
We show case 2) further restricts attention to vb ∈ [0, v−).
Note the condition tm < XB is equivalent to vb < H(γ) :=
φ γ/21+γ/2 . This function monotonically increases from zero at
γ = 0 to φ3 at γ = 1. We therefore have v+(γ) > H(γ),
since v+(γ) monotonically decreases from
2φ
3 at γ = 0 to
φ
3 at γ = 1. Now, we show v−(γ) < H(γ). It is true that
H(γ) > φ3 γ, as well as
v−(γ) = φ
1 − γ2 + γ
2
4 −
√
1− γ
3− γ + γ24
< φ
γ
2 +
γ2
4
3− γ + γ24
= φγ
1
2 +
γ
4
3− γ(1− γ4 )
<
φ
3
γ
(15)
The first inequality is due to
√
1− γ > 1−γ, and the second
inequality follows because the numerator (denominator) of
the second line is increasing (decreasing) in γ ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, v−(γ) < H(γ).
When the adversary folds, player B wins battlefield vb and
its payoff difference is
∆pitB = φ˜
(
XB − t
XA
− 1
)
+ vb − φ
(
XB
XA
− 1
)
= vb(2− XB
XA
)− φ− vb
XA
t, t ∈ [t−, t+].
(16)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
φ
3
2φ
3
φ
Calls ∀t ∈ [0, XB]
Folds if t ∈ [t−, t+]
γ = XBXA
v b
v−(γ)
Fig. 5. Player A’s optimal decisions over the entire parameter space
(γ, vb) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, φ) in the two player setting. The region above the
curve v−(γ) corresponds to case 1 in the proof of Theorem 1. The region
under the curve corresponds to case 2.
Since (16) is decreasing in t, it suffices to show it is negative
for t = t− and for all vb ∈ (0, v−):
∆pi
t−
B = vb(2− γ)−
(
vb +
φ− vb
2
γ −
√
Q(vb)
)
(17)
This function is decreasing with respect to vb:
∂∆pi
t−
B
∂vb
= 1− γ
2
+
Q′(vb)
2
√
Q(vb)
< 0. (18)
To verify, we know that Q(vb) > 0 and Q
′(vb) < 0 for
all vb ∈ (0, v−). Observe that (1 − γ2 ) + Q
′(0)
2
√
Q(0)
= 2 −
2
γ − γ < 0. Additionally, ∂∂vb
[
Q′(vb)√
Q(vb)
]
< 0 if and only if
1
2 (Q
′(vb))
2 − Q′′(vb)Q(vb) > 0. A calculation shows this
condition is equivalent to γ < 1. Thus, (18) holds. Because
∆pi
t−
B = 0 at vb = 0, we have∆pi
t−
B < 0 for all vb ∈ (0, v−).
This concludes the proof.
As Figure 5 depicts, player A folds only if player B pre-
commits a sufficient (but not too high) amount of force t
to a battlefield b that has a relatively low value. Even so,
player B does not obtain a higher payoff by forcing A to
fold because the value of battlefield b does not compensate
for the high pre-commitment required.
B. The Three-Player Setting
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof amounts to showing that in
the regions specified, player 1 receives higher payoff if it
pre-commits to the transfer t∗ > 0 than if it were to play the
original game, under the assumption that player A calls. Due
to this assumption, we must also show that player A prefers
to call on the pre-commitment rather than fold. Recall that
when playerA calls, we re-normalize the player budgets such
that X1 − t → X1−t1−t , X2 → X21−t , and XA − t → 1. Note
that, if player 1 pre-commits a force just below t∗ > 0, the
pairs (X1− t∗, X2) and (X1−t
∗
1−t∗ ,
X2
1−t∗ ) are in Case 2 (i = 2)
of the resulting game on battlefields B1 \ {b} and B2. We
split the remainder of the proof into the two different regions
specified in the claim.
Part 1): When the values X1, X2 are in Case 1 (i=1), and
player 1 does not pre-commit, the payoff to player 1 is
pi1(X1, XA1) = φ1 [X1 − 1] .
When player 1 pre-commits a force of t > 0 to battlefield
b ∈ B1 and player A calls, its payoff is
pit1(X1, X
call
A1 (t)) = (φ1−vb)

1−
1−
√
φ2
X1−t
1−t
X2
1−t
φ1−vb
X1−t
1−t

−vb.
Player 1 prefers to pre-commit a force of t > 0 if
pit1(X1, X
call
A1 (t)) ≥ pi1(X1, XA1). For t = t∗, this condition
simplifies to (6), i.e.,
φ2(X1 +X2 − 1) ≥ (φ1 − vb)X2(X1 − 1) + vbX1X2.
When player 1 pre-commits t > 0, the payoff to player A
for folding is
ufoldA (X
call
A1 (t), X1, t) =(φ1−vb)
[
X foldA1 (t)
X1−t −1
]
+φ2
[
1−X foldA1 (t)
X2
−1
]
−vb.
If player A calls, its payoff is
ucallA (X
call
A1 (t), X1, t) =(φ1 − vb)
[
XcallA1 (t)
X1−t
1−t
− 1
]
+ φ2
[
1−XcallA1 (t)
X2
1−t
−1
]
+vb.
For given player budgets X1, X2 > 0 and pre-commitment
t ∈ [0, X1], player A prefers to call when
ucallA (X
call
A1 (t), X1, t) ≥ ufoldA (X foldA1 (t), X1, t).
For t = t∗, this condition simplifies to (7),
2vb ≥
[
X1 − φ1 − vb
φ2
X2
]
φ2
X2
.
Part 2): When the values X1, X2 are in Case 2 (i=1), and
player 1 does not pre-commit a force, the payoff to player 1
is
pi1(X1, XA1) = φ1

 X1√
φ1X1X2
φ2
− 1

 .
When player 1 pre-commits a force of t > 0 to battlefield
b ∈ B1 and player A calls, its payoff is
pit1(X1, X
call
A1 (t)) = (φ1−vb)

1− 1−
√
φ2
X1−t
1−t
X2
1−t
φ1−vb
X1−t
1−t

−vb.
Player 1 prefers to pre-commit a force of t > 0 if
pit1(X1, X
call
A1 (t)) ≥ pi1(X1, XA1). For t = t∗, this condition
simplifies to (8),
φ2(X1 +X2 − 1) ≥
√
φ1φ2X1X2 − (φ1 − vb)X2.
Player A’s payoffs for calling and folding are the same as
in the previous part, so (9) must be satisfied.
